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The performance of football club
managers: skill or luck?
Adrian Bell, Chris Brooks∗ and Tom Markham
ICMA Centre, University of Reading, Whiteknights, PO Box 242, Reading RG6
6BA, UK
This paper develops a performance management tool and considers its application to the foot-
ball industry. Specifically, the resulting model evaluates the extent to which the performance
of English Premier League football club managers can be attributed to skill or luck when mea-
sured separately from the characteristics of the team. We first use a specification that models
managerial skill as a fixed effect and we then implement a bootstrapping approach to gener-
ate a simulated distribution of average points that could have taken place after the impact of
the manager has been removed. The findings suggest that there are a considerable number of
highly skilled managers but also several who perform below expectations. The paper proceeds
to illustrate how the approach adopted could be used to determine the optimal time for a club
to part company with its manager.
I. Introduction
Motivated by the much larger literature on the identification of
mutual fund manager skill, this paper proposes the adoption of a
bootstrapping methodology to evaluate the performance of football
club managers. The bootstrap is a technique that is highly suited to
the problem at hand since the distribution of points scored, and con-
sequently of the estimated model’s residuals, is highly nonnormal,
making inferences from more conventional parametric approaches
problematic. We are able to identify whether the number of points
per game secured by the manager is due to the characteristics
of the team or managerial skill. When used in a recursive win-
dow, the bootstrap can be used to examine whether a manager’s
performance is improving or weakening, and hence, we can deter-
mine whether he is ‘significantly weak’ and should therefore be
fired.
Association football1 is the world’s most popular sport and con-
tributes significantly to the global sports industry that is worth
in excess of £83.32 billion annually (Clark, 2010). Professional
football underpins the sport’s economic footing, with the English
Premier League (EPL), broadcast in 210 countries worldwide, lead-
ing the way with combined revenues of £2 billion among its 20
clubs in 2009. Despite the EPL’s substantial turnover, only six of
the league’s clubs managed to make a pre-tax profit in the same year
(Jones et al., 2010). This is in large part due to the failure of clubs to
∗Corresponding author. E-mail: c.brooks@icmacentre.rdg.ac.uk
1 Association football is commonly referred to as ‘soccer’ in the USA in order to distinguish the game from American football. Throughout the paper,
we use the term ‘football’ rather than ‘soccer’.
2 We have used the terms ‘sacking’ and ‘firing’ interchangeably throughout the paper as both are used in common parlance internationally to mean
immediate dismissal from a job.
control costs. The outlay on player registrations (transfers), player
wages and stadia development are the principal foundations for this.
Another prevalent cost for professional football clubs is the hiring
and firing of management teams.Acquiring the right manager is inte-
gral to a club’s on-field success (Brady et al., 2008). Conversely, the
appointment and subsequent dismissal of the wrong manager can be
extremely costly as managers are entitled to compensation if their
contracts are terminated early. For example, former Liverpool man-
ager Rafael Benítez was paid £6 million to vacate his position in
2010 (Herbert, 2010), Chelsea gave a ‘golden parachute’ to former
head coach, Luiz Felipe Scolari, worth £12.6 million (Fifield, 2010)
following his sacking in 2009 and the same club also paid former
manager José Mourinho £18 million in compensation following his
dismissal in 2007 (Burt, 2007).
In 2009, only four EPL managers had held their position for more
than 3 years: Rafael Benítez (4 12 years), David Moyes (7), Arsène
Wenger (12) andAlex Ferguson (22). In fact, the average managerial
tenure within the four English professional leagues between 1992
and 2005 was only 2.19 years (Bridgewater, 2009). Sackings2 seem
to be embedded in the culture of the game. A similar trend is visible
in the US sports domain where coaches of NBA, NFL, NHL and
MLB franchises had spent an average of 2.44 years at the helm
between 1987 and 1992 (McTeer et al., 1995). In some instances,
intuition and the weight of media hype encourages us to assume that
managers are sacked too early and without being given a fair run of
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games to prove their worth. Can we establish whether this is indeed
a realistic assumption to make?
While profitability may not be the yardstick used in football club
performance measurement, money has still become an increasingly
integral part of the game. A study encompassing top tier club player
wage bills and head coach salaries for 22 seasons from 1981/82 to
2002/03 in the German Bundesliga revealed that spending on man-
agerial and playing talent combined improves league performance
(Frick and Simmons, 2008). Analysis of the effects of management
change in the Bundesliga shows that the primary reasons for man-
agerial dismissals are poor on-field performance, a breakdown in
relations between the manager and directors, and media specula-
tion and intensity (Salomo and Teichmann, 2000). It is clear that
appropriately evaluating the performance of football club managers
is an important task, not just financially, but because of the impact
that the manager’s skill can have on the performance of his team.
Yet, the number of studies that have attempted this, described in the
following section, is surprisingly very small indeed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is
split into two parts – first, we discuss the evaluation of mutual fund
manager performance, and how we can apply a technique from this
literature in the football context. Second, we review the existing lit-
erature on the assessment of football club managerial performance
and what happens to this when there is managerial turnover. Section
3 discusses the data sources and methodology employed, while the
results from implementing the bootstrapping approach to the whole
sample are analysed in Section 4. Section 5 reveals the results when
the technique is used recursively, leading to comments on what man-
agerial changes should perhaps have been made during the sample
period. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
II. The Existing Literature
II.1. Evaluating mutual fund managers
To motivate our approach to evaluate the performance of football
club managers, we will adapt an established methodology from
existing research concerning the mutual fund industry. Following
Jensen’s (1968) seminal study, the returns generated by mutual funds
started to be considered in a risk-adjusted fashion rather than in raw
terms. Jensen considered performance after taking into account the
amount of market risk that the portfolio was exposed to and showed
that when considered in this light, almost no managers were able to
outperform.
More recently, studies have evaluated the performance of fund
managers using a model with three or four factors allowing for the
extent to which the fund was exposed to risks arising from gen-
eral market movements, and also whether the portfolio was tilted
towards small stocks, value stocks (with low price-earnings or mar-
ket value-to-book value ratios) or those with momentum (i.e. those
whose prices have risen over, say, the past year). Performance is
then measured by examining the statistical significance of the inter-
cept (termed ‘alpha’ in the finance literature) in those regressions
(see, e.g. Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997). The key reason
for adopting such an approach is that it ensures managers are not
rewarded for randomly picking stocks from within certain categories
that are widely documented to be profitable most of the time; thus, an
examination of these alphas will separate managers who have gen-
uine stock picking ability from those who naively followed these
strategies with no additional insight. The overwhelming conclusion
3 See, for example, Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Allen and Tan (1999), Chevalier and Ellison (1999), Blake and Morey (2000), Bollen and Busse
(2005), Kosowski et al. (2006) or Tonks (2005) and references therein.
from the very large body of evidence is that fund managers are
unable to yield positive returns once their fees are taken into account
and that any significant outperformance is hard to predict and
fleeting.3
In addition to the studies described above that use parametric
approaches based on regression to assess fund performance, more
recent work by Kosowski et al. (2006) and by Cuthbertson et al.
(2008) has employed a bootstrap approach to separate managerial
skill on one hand from luck and the degree of risk taken on the
other. Their approaches essentially involve estimating a regression
model to explain fund manager performance, bootstrapping from the
residuals and then reconstructing the time series of returns for the
fund under the null hypothesis of no fund manager outperformance
(in other words, with the regression intercept, alpha, set to zero). The
bootstrap is conducted, say, 1000 times to generate a distribution
of performance that is based only on luck and exposure to the risk
factors and not to managerial skill (since by construction the average
degree of outperformance has been set to zero). The core finding of
these studies is that, in both the USA and the UK, the number of
highly skilled managers with significant stock picking ability is very
small, but there is a larger pool of very poorly performing managers
whose results cannot be attributed purely to bad luck or to low
exposures to risk that generated low returns; rather, these managers
have significant ‘negative skill’.
II.2. Assessing football club managerial performance
We now examine previous academic studies from Belgium, the
Netherlands, the USA and the UK relating to why football
club managers are sacked and how these dismissals have been
assessed.
There have been a number of studies on the impact of chang-
ing professional football managers in various countries. Evidence
from the top three tiers of Belgian football between the 1998/99
and 2002/03 seasons found that on average, if a club’s perfor-
mance declined over a 2-month period, the coach would be sacked.
Further analysis of these clubs showed that on-field performance
actually deteriorated following a new managerial appointment when
compared with similarly performing teams (Balduck and Buelens,
2007).
Bruinshoofd and ter Weel (2003) examined whether the dismissal
of managers in the Netherlands brings an enhancement in results for
club sides. Sample data for this study were taken from the Dutch
Eredivisie (Premier League) between 1988 and 2000. There were
125 managerial sackings in the division over this period. An econo-
metric model was built to account for managerial performance four
games prior to and after a managerial departure. The results showed
that sackings come after declines in team performance and are fol-
lowed by improvements in performance. At first glance at such
a projection, it would seem that appointing a new manager does
improve a team’s results. However, the authors found this was not
the case when they compared the performance of similar clubs who
did not dismiss their manager, suggesting that in not sacking a man-
ager, the results of a poorly performing club would have improved
quicker. They conclude by stating that sacking a manager seems
to be ‘neither effective nor efficient in terms of improving team
performance’ (Bruinshoofd and ter Weel, 2003).
De Paola and Scoppa (2008) investigated managerial sackings
with regard to Italian football. Data were obtained regarding man-
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between the seasons of 2003/04 and 2007/08. The results originally
showed that changing a manager has a positive effect on Serie A
results, but this dissipates completely on the implementation of
the authors’ control (two-stage least-squares estimates) for endo-
geneity problems in replacing coaches. They therefore essentially
come to a similar opinion to Bruinshoofd and ter Weel in concluding
that changing a manager does not improve or deteriorate a team’s
performance.
A comprehensive study was conducted for English football by
Audas et al. (2002), where every UK Football League and Pre-
mier League game between the 1972/73 and 1999/00 seasons was
examined to assess the impact of managerial change on team perfor-
mance.A parametric model was constructed using the match results,
which enabled the assessment of the short-term impact of manage-
rial alterations. Many previous studies had been based on an entire
season rather than on a partial season. This research demonstrates
that there had been more than 700 cases of within-season managerial
change during the sample period. An ordered probit regression was
run to analyse these results. Its findings suggest that clubs changing
managers within season subsequently tended to perform worse than
those that did not (Audas et al., 2002).
The view that appointing a new manager has no effect or an
adverse outcome on a team’s performance is not by any means uni-
versal. Research by Bridgewater (2009) shows that appointing a
new manager will have a positive short-term effect on team results.
This is due to the fact that players will be out to try to impress
their new manager to ultimately keep themselves in employment.
The boost lasts for a short ‘honeymoon’ period of between 12 and
18 games after the appointment. After this period, performance of
changing a manager disappears. Therefore, on average, manage-
rial changes at football clubs do not improve performance in the
long term (Bridgewater, 2009). The view that results will deterio-
rate in the longer term is echoed by Hughes et al. (2010). Football
is often argued to be a ‘results driven business’ where current per-
formance is considered to be paramount, so it is understandable
that many club executives are willing to take a risk on appointing
a new manager to improve a club’s short-term fortunes (especially
when under the threat of relegation). If they sit back and watch
a current manager fail, they too may lose their jobs along with
the manager in question in what represents a cutthroat industry.
In exceptional circumstances, a team’s performance can improve
based on the ‘new culture’ a manager instils as, for example, in
the case of Guus Hiddink and South Korea in the 2002 World Cup
(Brady et al., 2008).
Given the significant costs involved with changing managers and
the disputed effects that the literature discussed above suggests such
a drastic step has on a team’s results, it is perhaps surprising that
there are so few studies that investigate whether there is an optimal
time to fire a manager. Hope’s (2003) model represents the only
attempt at developing a practical econometric technique to answer
this question.According to his approach, it is assumed that a football
manager’s core objective is to maximize the number of league points
accumulated. He suggests that a football club’s strategy consists of
three core factors with regard to managerial performance:
• Honeymoon: Length of the honeymoon period in which the
manager is exempt from being sacked.
• Trapdoor: Average number of points accumulated per game.
If the manager is below this figure, they will be sacked.
• Weight: Weight that most recent games will be given in
analysing the manager’s performance.
It is presumed that any manager will receive a ‘honeymoon
period’ on appointment. Following this period, a manager will be
fired if their performance drops below the club’s desired points tar-
get. The honeymoon and trapdoor variables are decided upon by
the model user. Using partial data from Premier League seasons
1996/97 to 2001/02, it was deduced that putting a weight of 47% on
the last five games made the model most efficient. With this weight-
ing, a manager should gain an average of at least 0.74 points a game
and at least 56.81 points over the course of a season. If a manager’s
performance is under the 0.74 average, he should be sacked by the
club (Hope, 2003).
While Hope’s model represents a significant step forward, he
outlines a number of drawbacks inherent in the approach, suggesting
that a consideration of alternatives is warranted. These include that
the model does not consider: whether games are played at home
or away, the quality of the opposition, the importance of avoiding
relegation, non-Premier League games, the financial and other costs
of firing a manager and the diverse aspirations of alternative clubs.
III. Data and Methodology
III.1. Data sources
The data employed in this study were collected from a multitude of
sources for the five EPL sample seasons from 2004/05 to 2008/09.A
list of the 48 managers to lose their positions during this period was
provided by the League Managers Association, the managers’union
in the UK. Premier League transfer fees for the desired period were
obtained from Transfer Market (http://www.transfermarkt.co.uk/),
while club wages came from Deloitte’s 2006–2010 Annual
Reviews of Football Finance (including Jones et al., 2010).
Individual football match results for the five sample seasons
(1900 games) were obtained from the results databases on
http://www.football-data.co.uk. Non-EPL games were compiled
from http://www.11v11.com and http://www.UEFA.com, as the
number of non-Premier league games played may have an influence
on a club’s league performance. Final Premier League tables for the
same seasons were sourced from http://www.soccerbase.com. All
EPL injuries, suspensions and player unavailability for the seasons
between 2005/05 and 2008/09 were compiled using UK broadsheet
newspapers: The Guardian, The Independent, The Telegraph and
The Times through the Lexis Nexis portal.
III.2. Methodology
We require a model that separates the impact of the manager on the
performance of the team from the effects of other characteristics.
This is not an easy task, since many intuitively obvious measures
of the characteristics of teams that may model their on-field points
scores are contaminated with the impact of the manager’s skill or
lack thereof – for example, bookmaker odds, the number of points
scored in previous matches, current or previous league position, etc.,
all have to be ruled out on these grounds.
Therefore, we come at the problem from an unobserved effects
point of view. Manager i obtains a given result with the team he is
managing/coaching at the time, and we regard manager character-
istics as an unobserved fixed effect. We therefore estimate a fixed
effects model as follows. Let yi,t denote the performance measure
(the number of points scored: 0 for a loss, 1 for a draw or 3 for a
win) for a team playing with manager i in fixture t
yi,t = ai +
k∑
j=1
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Fig. 1. Number of points awarded versus weekly wages.
where x are the characteristics of the team, ui,t are zero mean i.i.d.
disturbances with no specificity by fixture or manager, i = 1, . . . , N ;
t = 1, . . . , TN so that there are N managers each in charge of a team
for a total of TN matches during the 5-year period. In our sample,
TN runs from a minimum of 2 (Paul Sturrock) to a maximum of 190
matches for the four managers who were responsible for their clubs
for all five seasons that we examine. The manager fixed effect is
ai, regardless of which team they are managing, which may change
in the course of the sample, and we assume that none of the x are
also fixed by manager across matches, but the variables are chosen
judiciously to ensure that this is a reasonable assumption.
Over the 5 years for which we have Premier League data, there
are 1900 league matches and 60 managers. We estimate model (1)
and obtain estimates of both the manager fixed effects and the other
factors that capture team performance using the following variables
(with their motivation for inclusion):
1. the total player wage bill over the season in millions of
pounds; we argue that the wage bill is largely determined
by the quality of the players who have been purchased in the
past, and we assume that a manager would have purchased
the most appropriate players that the club’s budget would
allow;
2. the total net transfer spend in millions of pounds; this
measures the extent to which the club is currently able to
purchase high quality new players;
3. the total number of listed players who are injured for
match t;
4. the total number of listed players who are suspended for
match t;
5. the total number of listed players who are unavailable for
match t for a reason other than injury or suspension (e.g.
African Cup of Nations);
6. the total number of non-Premier league games that the team
plays during that season (i.e. cup games).
4 This is likely to induce first-order serial correlation in the residuals of the estimated model, and therefore, to improve the robustness of the inferences,
we employ heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors.
We expect 1 and 2 to positively affect match performance, while
3–5 will negatively affect it. The impact of the number of non-
Premier league games on the expected points score for league
matches is perhaps ambiguous for reasons which we will discuss
below.
In addition, the values of each of these characteristics for the
opposing team for match t are also used as explanatory variables,
with the signs expected to be the reverse of those for the team under
consideration. Since each match includes two teams, both having a
manager, it is necessary to include each game twice in the dataset
– once where the team and manager under consideration represent
the home team, and the other where they are the away team.4
For illustration, Fig. 1 plots the average number of points awarded
per game for each manager against the average annual wage bill, in
millions of pounds of the team(s) that they managed over our sample
period. It is evident from the scatter that there is a positive relation-
ship between points and wages, with a simple correlation of 0.75.
Successful managers are those the furthest above the line, while
those well below it are the least successful (although, of course,
only wages and no other team characteristics are accounted for by
this particular plot). The financial muscle of the historically ‘big
four’ teams (Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool and Manchester United)
is evident as their average wage bills are far bigger than the rest.
Clearly, the dependent variable in Equation 1 is limited since
it can only take on one of three integer values, and therefore, we
employ (separately) an ordered probit model. The results from
the estimation of this model are presented in Table 1. While the
results from the model estimation are not the primary focus of
the paper, they are none the less of interest. As the table shows,
there is a remarkable degree of consistency between the ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) and the probit estimates in terms of
both the parameters themselves and their levels of significance.
All statistically significant variables have the expected signs. Any
reason for players to be absent from possible inclusion in the squad
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Table 1. Estimation results for model including team character-
istics and manager fixed effects
Ordered probit
Variable OLS estimates estimates
Injuries −0.040 (0.011)∗∗∗ −0.039 (0.011)∗∗∗
Suspensions −0.104 (0.043)∗∗ −0.107 (0.046)∗∗
Unavailable −0.136 (0.064)∗∗ −0.126 (0.078)∗
Total wages 0.007 (0.002)∗∗∗ 0.008 (0.002)∗∗∗
Net transfer spend −0.001 (0.002) −0.001 (0.002)
Extra games −0.001 (0.006) −0.001 (0.005)
Injuriesopp 0.044 (0.010)∗∗∗ 0.045 (0.010)∗∗∗
Suspensionsopp 0.099 (0.043)∗∗ 0.096 (0.045)∗∗
Unavailableopp 0.076 (0.062) 0.113 (0.074)
Total wagesopp −0.009 (0.001)∗∗∗ −0.009 (0.001)∗∗∗
Net transfer spendopp −0.0001 (0.001) −0.0007 (0.001)
Extra gamesopp −0.016 (0.004)∗∗∗ −0.016 (0.004)∗∗∗
R2 or pseudo-R2 0.20 0.21
Notes: The model estimated is




The dependent variable is the number of points scored in match t by
manager i; 60 manager dummy variables are also included in the model,
but the estimates are not shown.
∗Significance at the 10% level.
∗∗Significance at the 5% level.
∗∗∗Significance at the 1% level.
nificant negative impact on the fitted number of points scored in the
match, and on the other hand, an increase in the number of play-
ers absent from the opposing team causes an increase in the fitted
number of points (although the number of unavailable players in the
opposing team is just outside of significance at the 10% level). A
five-man increase in the number of players absent from the squad for
the match causes a fall in the expected number of points of around
0.2 for injuries, 0.5 for suspensions and 0.6 for players unavailable
for other reasons. Given that the typical number of absent players is
around 3 or 4 but varies from 0 to 12, this is economically important.
The higher the total wage bill of the club (of the opposing team),
the higher (lower) the expected number of match points scored, and
both are significant at the 1% level. Net transfer spending is not a
statistically relevant factor (either for the team under consideration
or the opposing team), but this may reflect the cumulative influ-
ence of a number of years of expenditure on performance rather
than merely the current year, which we measure in this paper.5 An
increase in the total annual wage bill of £100 million (or a fall in
the opposition’s wage bill of the same figure) leads to an increase
in the expected number of points per match of 0.8 (0.9).6 The total
wage bills varied between £30 million (Stoke City) and almost £170
million (Chelsea) in the 2008/09 season.
The parameter estimate on the total number of additional games
played is negative and very insignificant for the team under con-
sideration but negative and significant for the opposing team. The
expected relationship between points scored in the league and the
number of non-Premier league fixtures is somewhat ambiguous
5 However, since it would be very difficult to construct a plausible cumulative measure of net transfer spending, we do not consider this issue further.
6 An increase in transfer expenditure of a similar figure leads to only a 0.1 fall (0.07 rise) in the expected number of points, although as we note, these
parameter estimates are not statistically significant.
7 See Effron and Tibshirani (1993) for a detailed discussion of how the bootstrap works.
because, on one hand, any additional games are a drain on the team’s
energy and are likely therefore to degrade league match performance
as players involved in large numbers of additional fixtures become
increasingly fatigued through the season. On the other hand, large
numbers of non-Premier league games are only an issue for teams
that are successful in those competitions, and therefore the perfor-
mance of the team outside the league might be a positive predictor
of performance within it.
We now proceed to discuss the bootstrapping approach that is
adopted to separate the impact of manager skill from team char-
acteristics when assessing the on-field performance of the club. If
there is no fixed effect, then there is no manager effect. Imposing
this restriction, Equation 1 becomes
yi,t = β0 +
k∑
j=1
βjxj,i,t + ui,t (2)
Or equivalently




Estimates of all but the intercept, β0, are available from
Equation 1. β0 is estimated as the global average across all games
and all managers of the number of points scored per match. We
are then able to regenerate the dependent variable under the null
hypothesis of no manager fixed effects as
y∗i,t = βˆ0 +
k∑
j=1
βˆjxj,i,t + uˆi,t (4)
This would get the expected value of performance under the null
that there was no manager effect since the manager effects have
been explicitly allowed for in the estimation of Equation 1 and
then subtracted out when the dependent variable is reconstructed
in Equation 4.
We proceed to sample with replacement from y∗i,t as constructed
in Equation 4, and for each of j = 1, . . . , 10,000 bootstrap replica-
tions, we generate TN draws and compute the average number of
points scored by manager i, y¯i∗i , at each replication j.7 This distribu-
tion represents the possible performances in matches managed by i
that may have occurred purely due to team characteristics and luck.
We then order the distribution of 10,000 average performances, y¯i∗i ,
and finally examine where the actual performance of manager i fits
within this ordered bootstrapped distribution. We define a manager
as ‘skilled’ if they are in the top 5% of the distribution of the number
of points that would have occurred purely as a result of other (non-
manager) team characteristics and chance, as ‘unskilled’ if they are
in the bottom 5% and ‘typical’ if they are anywhere in between.
IV. Results
Table 2 shows the key results for managerial performance. The aver-
age number of points for all managers from all games where each
game counts twice (once for each of the home and away managers)
is 1.37, and this provides a benchmark against which to judge each
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Table 2. Manager performance according to the bootstrap approach
Actual average Number of Expected number of Actual Is the manager’s % random
number of games points based on points-expected performance above, below draws
Manager points managed the bootstrap points or at expectations? better
Aidy Boothroyd 0.74 38 0.98 −0.24 Expected 94.93
Alain Perrin 0.90 20 1.10 −0.2 Expected 74.71
Alan Curbishley 1.28 100 1.09 0.19 Expected 8.57
Alan Pardew 1.23 74 1.10 0.13 Expected 20.59
Alex Ferguson 2.24 190 1.52 0.72 Above 0.00
Alex McLeish 1.00 24 0.92 0.08 Expected 32.05
Arsène Wenger 1.96 190 1.39 0.57 Above 0.00
Avram Grant 2.31 32 1.96 0.35 Above 2.27
Billy Davies 0.46 13 0.93 −0.47 Below 99.99
Bobby Robson 0.50 4 1.35 −0.85 Below 99.99
Bryan Robson 0.86 65 1.04 −0.18 Expected 90.19
Chris Coleman 1.17 109 1.04 0.13 Expected 15.31
Chris Hutchings 0.67 12 0.98 −0.31 Expected 80.79
David Moyes 1.56 190 1.02 0.54 Above 0.00
David O’Leary 1.17 76 1.10 0.07 Expected 30.85
Gareth Southgate 1.05 133 0.92 0.13 Expected 10.94
Gary Megson 1.07 76 1.00 0.07 Expected 33.91
Gianfranco Zola 1.29 35 1.13 0.16 Expected 22.81
Glenn Roeder 1.42 52 1.15 0.27 Expected 8.16
Graeme Souness 1.12 60 1.18 −0.06 Expected 64.36
Guus Hiddink 2.61 13 1.89 0.72 Above 0.00
Harry Redknapp 1.40 173 1.07 0.33 Above 0.13
Iain Dowie 0.93 85 1.05 −0.12 Expected 83.32
Jacques Santini 1.18 11 1.03 0.15 Expected 35.09
Joe Kinnear 0.86 35 1.06 −0.2 Expected 88.39
José Mourinho 2.33 120 1.77 0.56 Above 0.00
Juande Ramos 1.17 35 1.06 0.11 Expected 30.96
Kevin Ball 0.50 10 0.95 −0.45 Below 97.35
Kevin Keegan 1.16 49 1.08 0.08 Expected 33.72
Lawrie Sanchez 0.65 20 0.81 −0.16 Expected 79.57
Les Reed 0.57 7 1.11 −0.54 Expected 90.61
Luiz Felipe Scolari 1.96 25 1.90 0.06 Expected 41.52
Mark Hughes 1.42 185 1.09 0.33 Above 0.03
Martin Jol 1.51 113 1.10 0.41 Above 0.01
Martin O’Neill 1.51 114 1.08 0.43 Above 0.02
Mick McCarthy 0.36 28 0.88 −0.52 Below 99.99
Neil Warnock 1.00 38 0.92 0.08 Expected 31.79
Nigel Worthington 0.87 38 1.02 −0.15 Expected 78.64
Paul Hart 1.08 12 1.15 −0.07 Expected 53.92
Paul Ince 0.76 17 0.94 −0.18 Expected 76.30
Paul Jewell 0.93 101 0.96 −0.03 Expected 57.43
Paul Sturrock 1.50 2 1.15 0.35 Expected 25.05
Phil Brown 0.92 38 0.88 0.04 Expected 41.11
Rafa Benítez 1.95 190 1.39 0.56 Above 0.00
Ricky Sbragia 0.74 19 0.97 −0.23 Expected 82.45
Roy Hodgson 1.32 57 1.01 0.31 Above 3.71
Roy Keane 1.02 53 0.92 0.1 Expected 28.67
Sam Allardyce 1.45 154 1.08 0.37 Above 0.00
Sammy Lee 0.55 11 1.04 −0.49 Below 99.32
Steve Bruce 1.09 150 0.99 0.1 Expected 17.24
Steve Coppell 1.20 76 0.95 0.25 Expected 5.97
Steve McClaren 1.42 57 0.99 0.43 Above 0.54
Steve Wigley 0.64 14 1.03 −0.39 Below 97.96
Stuart Pearce 1.19 85 1.10 0.09 Expected 27.17
Sven-Göran Eriksson 1.45 38 1.13 0.32 Expected 6.76
Tony Adams 0.67 15 1.14 −0.47 Below 98.59
Tony Mowbray 0.84 38 0.82 0.02 Expected 45.78
Tony Pulis 1.18 38 0.86 0.32 Expected 6.04
Velimir Zajec 0.62 13 0.88 −0.26 Expected 80.49


























The performance of football club managers 25
to achieve this average, which is more than half the total number of
managers because the distribution of points is not symmetric. Inter-
estingly and by coincidence, teams with no permanent manager
generated exactly this number of points on average.
If we start by focusing on the actual average number of points
secured by each manager, ignoring for the moment the finances
and any other team characteristics, the top-performing managers
by a considerable margin are Guus Hiddink (2.61 points per match
on average), José Mourinho (2.33), Avram Grant (2.31) and Alex
Ferguson (2.24).8 At the other end of the performance spectrum,
Kevin Ball (0.45), Billy Davies (0.46) and Mick McCarthy (0.51)
secured the lowest number of points per match on average through
their tenures during our sample period.
However, as has been discussed above, focusing on raw measures
of performance that do not allow for the funds available to a manager
or other team characteristics could lead to a misleading and incom-
plete measure of manager effectiveness. If we now focus on under-
or out-performance relative to expectations, we observe a somewhat
different picture. We first calculate the difference between the actual
average number of points secured and the number that would have
been expected given the characteristics of the team during that sea-
son. The latter is calculated as the median number of points from the
10,000 bootstrap replications and measures the number that would
have been awarded given that the manager-specific effects have been
removed.
From our sample, the managers who underperformed the most on
this measure are Bobby Robson (in his final four games at Newcastle
United), who managed to score less than half the number of points on
average than would have been expected (0.50 versus 1.35), and Les
Reed (0.57 versus 1.1). Similarly, even though expectations of Mick
McCarthy were much lower than average (0.88 points per game), he
secured less than half that figure (0.36). The best managers relative
to expectations are Alex Ferguson and Guus Hiddink, equal on 0.72
more points on average per match than would have been expected.
Next are Arsène Wenger, José Mourinho and Rafa Benítez with
around 0.56 more points than expected. Of all 60 managers, it is
interesting that on this measure, having no permanent manager at
all is the ninth best. This may reflect the fact that players are likely
to put in extra effort in the short term under a caretaker manager
as their future at the club and livelihood may be at stake. Also of
note are Sam Allardyce, David Moyes, Steve McClaren and Martin
O’Neill, who all performed well with limited resources.
We now focus on whether managers perform above or below
expectations in a statistically significant sense by comparing the
average number of points generated by the manager with the dis-
tribution of performance that arises from the 10,000 bootstraps. If
we use a 1% (5%) rule to define performances statistically different
from their expected values, we have 13 (15) above and 4 (7) below
expectations. Thus, comparing the results with those obtained by
applying a similar approach to fund manager performance, we find
that a considerably higher proportion of football managers appear
to add value, or to be highly skilled, when compared with their
counterparts in the investment world.
Mick McCarthy, Sammy Lee, Bobby Robson9 and Billy Davies
all scored lower average points per match than over 99% of arti-
ficially generated managerial performance. At the other end of the
8 Three of the best performing managers were from Chelsea, the club with the highest budget in the Premier League over the sample period.
9 We should again note here that Bobby Robson managed only four games within our sample period and therefore, as we argue below, this is not really
a sufficient number to effectively evaluate his performance.
10 Alternatively, we could argue that any manager whose average points score falls within the top 5% of the artificially generated managerial performance
in their category is performing excellently. However, since no action is required by clubs in respect of top performing managers, we focus on those at
the other end of the spectrum.
spectrum, for Alex Ferguson, Arsène Wenger, David Moyes, Guus
Hiddink, José Mourinho, Rafa Benítez and Sam Allardyce, not a
single one of the 10,000 randomly generated managers was able to
outperform them.
V. A Bootstrap approach to determining the
point at which to sack a manager
We next adapt the method described above to develop an approach
that could be used to evaluate football club manager performance
in real time. Although we cannot tell how a sacked manager would
have performed if he had remained in office, we are able to achieve
two goals: first, we can identify a poorly performing manager who
perhaps should have been a target for contract termination before it
actually occurred; second, we can identify from among the list of
managers who were sacked those where the decision was, accord-
ing to our analysis, made prematurely. In order to achieve this, we
essentially employ the bootstrap using a recursive estimation win-
dow, starting with the first 10 games for which the manager is in
place during our sample period. We employ 10 games as a mini-
mal threshold since sample sizes lower than this seem insufficient
to gauge a manager’s abilities as per Hope (2003). This procedure
is repeated and a further game added to the sample until we reach
the end of the manager’s tenure or the end of our sample period; it
generates a time series of average actual points per match achieved
until that point in time, together with the bootstrapped distributions.
Of the 48 managers who departed from their clubs over our sam-
ple period, 21 resigned while 27 were sacked. Table 3 breaks down
the reasons for the managerial changes in more detail. It is evi-
dent that there is considerable variation in managerial turnover over
our five-season sample period. In 2005/06, there were only three
sackings, but in 2007/08, this had increased to nine. It is also the
case that some teams are represented several times in the table, with
departures occurring repeatedly, especially among teams typically
occupying the lower parts of the table (and Chelsea). This perhaps
reflects the unrealistic expectations of certain club owners or their
fans, who entrust the manager to perform something not far short
of a miracle in a short time and on a tight budget.
Table 3 of course identifies those managers who actually parted
company with their clubs and does not involve any judgement on
whether they should in reality have done so. In order to make such
judgements, we employ the bootstrap as described above, assuming
a 5% (one-sided) level of statistical significance for the purpose of
this research. Therefore, any manager who performs worse than 95%
of the generated managerial performance in their category could be
a candidate for the sack.10
Given that the recursive bootstrap approach leads to a perfor-
mance measure for every manager for every game beyond the initial
10, due to space constraints it is not possible to present every result
in this paper. However, we can first make some general observa-
tions before moving onto the specific results. First, in terms of the
average number of points scored per game relative to the number
expected, it seems that managerial performance does tend to settle
down fairly quickly so that a reasonably accurate assessment can be
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Table 3. A list of managers sacked (left panel) and resigned (right panel) from EPL teams 2004–2009
Sackings Resignations
Season Club Manager Club Manager
2004/05 Southampton Paul Sturrock Man City Kevin Keegan
Newcastle Bobby Robson Tottenham Jacques Santini
Blackburn Graeme Souness Portsmouth Harry Redknapp
West Brom Gary Megson Portsmouth Velimir Zajec
Southampton Steve Wigley
2005/06 Portsmouth Alain Perrin Charlton Alan Curbishley
Newcastle Graeme Souness Middlesbro Steve McClaren
Sunderland Mick McCarthy
2006/07 Aston Villa David O’Leary Bolton Sam Allardyce
Charlton Iain Dowie Wigan Paul Jewell
West Ham Alan Pardew Sheff Utd Neil Warnock
Fulham Chris Coleman Charlton Les Reed
Newcastle Glenn Roeder
Man City Stuart Pearce
2007/08 Chelsea José Mourinho Blackburn Mark Hughes







Man City Sven-Göran Eriksson
2008/09 Tottenham Juande Ramos West Ham Alan Curbishley
Blackburn Paul Ince Wigan Steve Bruce
Portsmouth Tony Adams Portsmouth Harry Redknapp
Chelsea Luiz Felipe Scolari Sunderland Roy Keane
Newcastle Kevin Keegan




managers emerge very quickly and managers whose teams show a
very weak performance at the outset are virtually never able to turn
things around. For example, Fig. 2 plots the number of matches that
the manager has acted as manager (starting from 10) on the x-axis
against the percentage of managers simulated by the bootstrap who
were able to outperform Arsène Wenger. It is very clear that Wenger
was quickly established as being better than over 95% of random
managers, and after running the team for 15 games from the start of
our sample period, he was better than 99%.
Figure 3 replicates this for Martin Jol, who started off as a
mid-performing manager of Tottenham. His performance rapidly
improved so that after around 30 games he would have been clas-
sified as significantly skilled. On the other hand, Graeme Souness
(Fig. 4) maintained his early average performance at both the clubs
he managed during our sample period, which is perhaps also indica-
tive that managerial performance is largely unaffected by switching
clubs once any initial honeymoon period has warn off. Finally, Fig. 5
shows that Aidy Boothroyd’s performance was below expectation
right from the very first point that it was evaluated, and, apart from
a couple of wins early in his tenure, did not improve and Watford
were relegated.
11 Reported on the BBC News website, 14 December 2004 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/teams/s/southampton/4094335.stm).
We now provide one illustrative example of a manager who
the recursive bootstrap reveals could have been sacked during the
period before they actually were. Having gained great renown as
a coach (later becoming English National Coach for 17–21-year-
old players in 2007), Steve Wigley (Southampton 2004/05) became
the Southampton manager in August 2004 but was allowed only
a short run in this position and was sacked on 8 December 2004
after 14 games in charge. The bootstrapping model reveals that
he was performing below expectations as early as 4 November
2004 following the club’s 2–2 home draw with West Bromwich
Albion. Wigley’s then performance level was worse than 99.12%
of generated managers. His performance remained below 95% of
randomized managers for the subsequent four games before his
sacking. Wigley himself was rather philosophical about the abrupt
change, commenting ‘Now that might have riled some people but
I’m not going to whinge about my job being offered to some-
body else. That’s football.’11 An extra two points would have kept
Southampton in the Premier League, and one could argue that this
may possibly have been attainable had the club parted company
with the manager earlier. However, it is of interest to note that even
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Fig. 2. Bootstrap results for Arsène Wenger.
Note: The figure plots the percentage of times that the manager was outperformed by a randomized manager in the recursive bootstrap.








































Fig. 3. Bootstrap results for Martin Jol.
Note: The figure plots the percentage of times that the manager was outperformed by a randomized manager in the recursive bootstrap.
Southampton in the Premier League, despite having a good track
record in such positions.
As suggested above, the model can also identify those managers
who were sacked prematurely, or where perhaps off-the-field issues
clouded the judgements of the boards concerned. An example will
serve to demonstrate this in practice. Sven-Göran Eriksson was
sacked as manager of Manchester City on 2 June 2008 after only
one season at the helm. Results from the bootstrapping model show
that Eriksson’s performance was vastly improving at the time of his
dismissal. Our analysis showed that only 22% of random managers
were better at the start of his tenure but this had enhanced to 5% prior
to his sacking. This put him just outside the top class managers in
England suggesting that he should not have been fired. However, the
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Graeme Souness - Blackburn Rovers 2004/05 








































Fig. 4. Bootstrap results for Graeme Souness.
Note: The figure plots the percentage of times that the manager was outperformed by a randomized manager in the recursive bootstrap.








































Fig. 5. Bootstrap results for Aidy Boothroyd.
Note: The figure plots the percentage of times that the manager was outperformed by a randomized manager in the recursive bootstrap.
sacked Eriksson prior to selling the club to the Abu Dhabi United
Group for Development and Investment.
VI. Conclusions
This paper has developed a new approach to measuring the extent
to which the performance of EPL football club managers can be
attributed to skill or luck when measured separately alongside the
characteristics of the team. Following an approach outlined in the
literature focusing on the mutual fund industry, we first used a spec-
ification that models managerial skill as a fixed effect and examines
the relationship between the number of points earned in league
matches and the club’s wage bill, transfer spending and the extent to
which they were hit by absent players through injuries, suspensions
or unavailability. We then implemented a bootstrapping approach
after the impact of the manager on team performance has been
removed. This simulation generates a distribution of average points
per match collected under the null hypothesis of no manager impact
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the manager was then compared with this distribution to ascertain
the extent to which, after allowing for the resources at his disposal
and other team characteristics, the club manager significantly out-
performed or underperformed what would have been expected. We
show that, unlike the fund management industry, the UK appears
to have had a number of highly talented football managers whose
success cannot be purely attributed to luck or the quality of their
teams. On the other hand, there also existed managers whose per-
formances were below expectations. We have evidence to support
two key themes: first, that football club directors or owners who
sack underperforming managers at a very early stage of their tenure
sometimes make a decision supported by the bootstrapping model,
if perhaps not for the correct reasons; and second, we can identify
skilled football managers who, on occasion, are sacked for reasons
that cannot be attributed to their on-the-field performance.
We then proceeded to present an approach that could be employed
to evaluate football club managers in real time. It is evident that man-
agerial performance can plausibly be gauged after 10 games with
outstanding managers shining right from the start and the under-
performing managers rarely being able to reverse their teams’ early
failures. Managers who begin as mediocre performers tend to remain
there as well, although their future fortunes could also go into either
extreme. The lesson, therefore, is that managers who perform below
expectation usually remain that way and therefore it may be opti-
mal to remove them from office sooner rather than later; on the
other hand, those managers who are merely somewhat disappointing
should be given time to further develop their teams.
The research conducted in this paper could usefully be extended
in a number of different directions. First, the approach to evaluating
managers in real time as outlined in Section 5 could be honed in sev-
eral ways. For example, current managers within the professional
domain could be evaluated using a rolling rather than recursive win-
dow, so that only the results in their most recent matches (say, the
most recent 20) are taken into account. Alternatively, in the present
model, the points were averaged to construct the measure of manager
performance, but it would be possible to weight the points (e.g. using
an exponential function) so that while all matches in the manager’s
history affect his current performance measure, the most recent
matches carry greater weight. Given the way that we have taken an
unweighted average, managers who have had very long tenures in
post (e.g.Alex Ferguson andArsèneWenger) would have to display a
prolonged and extremely poor performance before the model would
suggest that they should be fired. Use of a scheme that gave more
weight to recent games or no weight to games more than, say, a sea-
son ago, would reduce the ability of managers to rest on the laurels
of a historically strong performance. Finally, the technique outlined
above could sensibly be applied to other industries where the perfor-
mance of those in leadership positions can be objectively measured.
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